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I need hardly say it is an enormous pleasure for
me to take part in this 85th anniversary celebration of
the Sherman Act.

It is a homecoming, a reunion, and a pledge

to help maintain the values which each of us sees in our own
way in that historic charter of freedom.

As alumni, conscious

as we are that many of us had our experiences with the antitrust
division at different times, we are prepared to welcome outsiders
to our group.

And we know that outsiders are <here.

I would

like to say this conforms with the modern temper witness
the Freedom of Information Act.

But the fact is that those

of us who were involved with the antitrust laws realize that
these laws have always moved with bursts of publicity and
occasionally with high drama.

The antitrust laws are the

public's business, and so we welcome the outsiders.
hope

~hey

But we

have the faith, shared by plaintiff's and defense

counsel alike.

In some sense I choose to believe this is a

gathering of true believers.

It is because we are true

believers that in the past at least there have been so many
sects among us, so many contrary positions strongly held.
The most important
antitrust laws have survived.
in strength.

th~ng,

of course, is that the

I believe they have survived

They have been of inestimable value to our country •

They are an expression of the importance of a recognition that
liberty is to be found not only in the First Amendment but in
th~

ability tu

~~ke

choices free of overwhelming government

directions and intervention.

The antitrust laws, in their

basic theory, are built upon a view of enterprise and of choice,
which property and access to the market give, and I would claim
them as among the most important civil liberties.
older view, often in

disr~pute.

This is an

Although often violated, this

view has been sufficiently strongly held to give our country
unusual diversity and creativity.

This view and its manifestations

in the Sherman Act have shaped and protected our democracy.
The survival of the Sherman Act has not always been
a sure thing.

Throughout its existence the Act has been under

periodic attack.
fit our faith.

There have been frequent revivals.

Revivals

Some of us came to the antitrust division only

a few years after the demise of the Sherman Act was firmly'
predicted.

The revival of the forties was chiefly the

vision of Thurman Arnold.

I don't think it is unfair to put

it that way, although Thurman was surrounded by persons of
exceptional ability.

Some of them are here.

They will forgive

me for this statement, because I think they will agree with it.
But the opportunity for Thurman's entrance was given by Robert
Jackson, who began the revival in 1937 with more than a note
of skepticiam -- a thought that this was the last try, a

lurking belief, which many thinking people shared, that a
different form of government control might be necessary.
"The policy to restrain concentration of wealth
through combination or conspiracies to restrict competition,"
Assistant Attorney General Robert Jackson wrote, "had not
achieved its pur:pose."

"Concentration of ownership and

control of wealth were never greater than today," he said.
Looking over the forty-seven year history of the Sherman Act,
he observed that the "almost unanimous verdict • • • would be
that the enforcement has been more spectacular than successful,
that legal prosecutions have not suppressed monopoly • • •
a half century of litigation has not made the law either
understandable or respected."

The antitrust laws were "full

of loopholes," failed to "break up price controlling
organizations, or to check the continuing concentration of
wealth and of industrial control."

He noted the antitrust

laws represented "an effort to avoid detailed government
regulation of business by keeping competition in control of
prices."

It w.as hoped to save govern:ment from the conflicts

and accumulations of grievances which continuous price control
would

produ~e,

but perhaps if the antitrust laws failed in this

one last effort government regulation of a different type
would be necessary.

The regulation he had in mind was regulation

by governmental commission.

Perhaps in some instances it might

have gone further to government ownership.

The Jackson doubts were natural.

His last chance

remarks were written in the aftermath of the National Recovery
Administration -- an attempt to replace the Sherman Act with
the collusion of. industrial self government.

The first

director of the NRA, after he departed from his post, wrote
a book explaining what he had been up to.

Here are his 1935

remarks:
"You can't have recovery without amending the
Antitrust Acts because you must prevent a repetition
of 1922-29. You c'an't do that without control and
can't have that control under Antitrust legislation.
Those Acts have failed in every crisis. They had to
be forgotten during the war to enable the country to
defend itself. When they came back to memory in 1919,
they set the stage for what happened up to 1929. They
contributed to the boom and they were helpless in -the
crash. Without amendment, following the principles of
NIPA, they will go on (as they did) to create the
very conditions of monopoly and erasure of the
individualism which they were conceived to prevent
and in the future, as in the past, they will have to
be abandoned in any crisis, economic or military.
Unless so amended, they have no place in the mechanized,
highly organized, and integrated civilization in which we
live. There is no more vital and fundamental issue
before the country than whether we are going to control
modern scientific and industrial development to our use
or suffer it to our destruction.
"The only forces that can control it are in~ustrial self
government under Federal supervision • • • "
In the background 'of these remarks by Hugh Johnson were
the frequent complaints from: some economists and businessmen
that the American antitrust laws had made it impossible for
-American firms to compete with giant foreign companies or cartelS(

in world markets.

Those complaints appeared before World

War I, were repeated in the 'period between the two world wars, and,
not surprisingly, seem to be reappearing today in a somewhat
different version.

The Johnson remarks also carried forward an

extreme version of some aspects of the trade association movement
of the Twenties, and of course he was stating much of the
language of the technocrats.
The Jackson skepti'cal last chance did turn into the most
creative periods of the Sherman Act, rivaling in doctrinal
development the Taft period, exceeding all prior times in the
reach of the Act, providing the platform for what has come since.
Many, perhaps most, of you here today made and shared in the
subsequent experience.

And some of you indeed are providing

the current leadership or response to the leadership of the present
antitrust division.

This experience is the more surprising and the

more important because in the forest of regulatory commissions
created since Jackson's last chance, the antitrust division is
almost an oasis.

So there is a bond among us; we share

something quite unique.
In response-to this bond and the affection which goes
with it, I thought it might be appropriate to use this occasion
to attempt to state some of the things I believe I have learned
about antitrust enforcement.

I would rather have a discussion

on these points, because I am rather sure we do not all agree.
We probably never did agree in all respects, anyway, and
subsequent experiences have caused us to change our minds, or
at least given us time to rethink the bases for our opinions.
Yet I thought it might be a worthwhile exercise for me to attempt
to set down some conclusions.

I hasten to add I don't think my

views will surprise anyone, nor do I think they should be given
any particular weight.

Indeed perhaps they should be discounted

because of the government position I presently hold.
I believe my knowledge of the general direction of the
present Antitrust Division is fairly complete.
Kauper and his deputies an'd staff.

I admire Tom

I did have a conversation with

Tom Kauper about what I thought I might say on this occasion.
I was afraid someone might think I was setting forth a program
for the Antitrust Division, and of course if I did that, I
would really want it to come from him although through my mouth.
But Tom Kauper is away and I have had to write this speech
myself.

My humility on this matter is not put on.

feel humble.
I

I don't

I have just been well trained.
~annot

get out of my mind two incidents among many

which occurred when I was in the Antitrust Division.

One was in

the very early days when Thurman Arnold took me up with him in the
private e;levator to show the Attorney General, who was Robert
Jackson -- two floors above -- a document which Thurman thought ('.
was quite exciting and "hot."

The document seemed in any event

to implicate a large company in a cartel arrangement.

Before

anyone asks me under the Freedom· of Information Act to supply
a copy of that document, let me say at once I have forgotten what
the document was.

But I do recall that Thurman flashed the page

in frcntof Jackson without further explanation, and I didn't see
how anyone could possibly understand from that glimpse what the
significance of the disclosure would be.

After getting some

appropriate expression from Jackson to the effect that it seemed
to be quite a document, Thurman whisked out of the room -- I
trailing after him -- and down the elevator we went.

"Why didn't

you tell the Attorney General what the case was about?" I .asked
as we descended.

"You should never tell the Attorney General

anything," Thurman said.

That was my first lesson on Attorney

Generalship.
I remember as a second occasion

Francis Biddle saying

quite seriously and plaintively that he always opened the morning
paper with apprehension because it would probably report something
the Antitrust Division was doing which he didn't know about.
And he had reason to be apprehensive.

So the second lesson.

I would not have thought I needed a third lesson, but
as a useful reminder not to take too seriously the twelve-hour
a-day minimum I put in on my present job, I was given a lesson by
the Washington Star a few days ago.

The Star asked a friend

of mine, r not in the Antitrust Division, to be sure -- but
nevertheless I think it has some relevance

whether the turmoil

in the Justice Department, the rapid turnover of Attorneys
General, hadn't left the Department suffering badly.

With

the graciousness which all of us cherish as a part of Washington
life, my friend responded brightly that he thought things
,had settled down, but anyway the Justice Department consisted
of dedicated professionals, so it didn't make too much
difference what the political leadership at the top looked
like.
So now that I have been given the freedom which
comes from being ineffectual, let me seriously try to state
what my views or observations are.
As a starter, I think that experience shows one
should not expect the defense trial bar to attempt to
campaign seriously for a quiet Antitrust Division.

I

certainly don't mean that the defense antitrust bar wants
the division 'to win all its cases, or even to bring them all'.
But quietude does not seem to be the aim, and perhaps that
is a good thing.
I have another observation which perhaps derives
from too little experience.

When I was in the Antitrust

Division and for some time thereafter, I remained amazed not
only at what people put into writing but the collusive
arrangements they sometimes sought to achieve.

It is of course

true that documents written in the heat of a transaction or at
the end of a tiring day often appear in a false light when they
appear years later.

My thought was, however, that due to the grea

increase in antitrust prosecutions and the plethora of lawyers
surrounding most large companies, there never would be again
the kind of conspiratorial price fixing cases which appeared
in the early antitrust cases.

Indeed I was rather sorry for

my successors, which include many in this audience, because I
thought they never
macabre discovery.

'~ould

have the thrill of that kind of

Indeed when I was teaching the antitrust

laws, I used to tell my classes that such simple but overly
conspiratorial cases were a thing of the past.

It was on

such a day in February, 1961, when I was giving forth with
this profound wisdom that a student showed me a newspaper
item describing an indictment, fines and prison terms and an
arrangement among major electrical firms couched in terms of
phases of the moon, meetings

desc~ibed

as choir practices,

and a variety of other codes used for price fixing.

My

conclusion undoubtedly over-reaches this jolting experience,
but it tends to confirm a view that Adam Smith was probably
right, 'and vigilance both within and outside such companies
always will be needed.

If this is true, it says something

important about the everlasting necessity for vigorous

antitrust enforcement against price-fixing or collusive
production controlling or division of territory arrangements.
In our excitement about problems of concentration, I think we
often tend to

forgE~t

this.

Indeed as some of the experts

have pointed out, the nub of the problem of concentration is
likely to be the greater ease with which collusive arrange
ments may be arrived at.
The present Antitrust Division has greatly increased
its attack on collusive arrangements.

While the statistics,

as one might expect, are quite imperfect, my rough estimate
is that the enforcement level last year was about three times
higher than the average for the period from 1965 through
1969.

During an inflationary period, when productivity has

particular importance, I think this is a desirable direction. '
But I think it is desirable anyway.
The antitrust laws have great symbolic value.

This is

true with the enforcement of most laws, and is one reason,
although of course there are other reasons as well, that laws
ought not to be enforced in secrecy.
reason why this is true of antitrust.

But there is a special
Antitrust is supported

as a viable alternative to more severe, more interfering,
more bureaucratic forms of government regulation.

It is in

that sense that antitrust is regarded as nonregulatory.
this viability must be believed.

But

It must be demonstrated·.

It must be shown that cases can and will be brought.

I do

not think this aspect of antitrust enforcement is in any sense

illicit.

And if this is so, it does suggest, although there

are other reasons for this suggestion as well, that antitrust
enforcement ought', to be progranmatic. I mean two things by
this.

First, I do not think a successful antitrust program

can be launched merely by waiting for complaints to arrive.
Collusive arrangements do often break. down; there is bickering
and some disclosure.

But successful enforcement in this and

other fields of 'non-violent crime must be based on a much
more affirmative scrutiny of what is going on.

Second, I

think the effectiveness of antitrust action, as well as the
ability to uncover other violations, is greatly enhanced if
one proceeds industry by industry.
only way to proceed.

I don't think this is the

Violations, as we know, sometimes

follow the pattern of the assumed loopholes of new devices.
I would want to be reassured, for example, that the
Supreme Court's Kewanee Oil Co. case, which gave patent-like
monopoly to non-patented secrets, was not to be used as the
basis for cartel-like exchange agreements.

As we know, this

was the history of many cartel arrangements in the past.

In

any event I think an enforcement program requires an articu
late explanation of its focus, b?th to help the enforcement,
program itself and to give reassurance tp the public of the
viability of the law.
As an aside let me mention that the new revision of the
Federal Criminal Code in S. 1 would make it a criminal offense
to steal another's ideas, a proposal that surely will drive

scholars wild.

This entertaining outcome, however, undoubtedly

results from a too broad reading of the provision.
A central question concerning antitrust enforcement is
whether it must be based solely on correct economic theory.
I find the answer to this rather simple.
I do think it is

prope~

The answer is "no.1I

to criticize antitrust cases and

doctrines when they justify results on economic grounds which
don't stand up.

But antitrust laws in a proper se:nse have

always had political overtones.

The over-riding purpose of

the law, particularly the law against monopolies, was to
give assurance that private firms would not be exercising
what was taken as the equivalent of governmental power.

When

Senator Hoar explained his bill, which became the Sherman Act,
he emphasized the menace which monopolies, as they were
perceived, would have on republican institutions.

When

Robert Jackson gave his last chance speech, he spoke of the
ideal of political and economic democracy.

I am prepared to

accept therefore, as one indeed must, the judgment of the
courts or Congress as to banned conduct even though from an
economic standpoint in many cases the ban may make very little
sense, or be fairly trivial in its economic impact.
not an appeal in favor of or in defense of nonsense.

This is
I

think it is a realistic interpretation of the way the law has
developed, and is more consistent with its common law
background and process.

I would not myself otherwise know

how to explain the outcome of the DuPont-General Motors case,
although I believe the result was to be expected.

This is to

say there are some limits as to what size can do -- because
that is in fact what the law is, quite apart from what it
says it is, and there are also some practices which may be
banned, such as tie-in arrangements attached to patents,
even though economic theory mayor may not, depending on the
facts, find an actual enlargement of the patent monopoly.
I realize this statement, since it seems to leave the
often illusory security of economic doctrine, might suggest
I

advocate no sensible limits to the exten'sion of the

antitrust laws in many directions and that

I

do not see the

necessity for the development of consistent judicial or
legislative activities for antitrust.

But

I

have not said

either of these things, and I should at once affirm that an
antitrust doctrine which can be .shown to be seriously harmful
in its economic impact is of course subject to the greatest
questioning.

My guess is that the antitrust laws have suffered

more from the development of assumed economic doctrine to
justify continually the further extension and reach of the
laws.

The basic problem of the antitrust laws is not only

that they have to be vigorously enforced, but also that they
have to be saved from their friends.
The basic guidelines for present problems
have to be faced up to are these:

(1)

I

think

collusive behavior

to restrict production must be vigorously pursued.

I

believe

this should be done in an articulated industry to industry
basis; (2)

in the field of concentration or structure of

industry, short of the problem of monopolization or mono
polizing to foreclose entry, there still must be some concern
for that kind of felt or believed domination, or for that
lack of inventiveness or creativity in industry which gives
rise to an overwhelming doubt as to whether the antitrust
laws can perform their function.

This may be a restatement

of traditional doctrines which emphasize the way monopoly
power was acquired or the way it has been maintained.

But I

go back to the symbolic nature of the antitrust laws, and
their paramount purpose to be seen as a viable alternative
to more stringent forms of government managerial forms of
regulation.

I cannot emphasize too strongly that I am not

advocating the bringing of cases where violation is doubtful;
on the contrary, I am saying that in fixing the priority for
cases one must consider not only the effect within an industry
but on the more general impact in law enforcement.

In this

sense, and perhaps this is paradoxical but I believe it is
true, catching monopoly in what is called its incipiency by
preventing acquisitions when the market control is very small,
under section seven as it has been interpreted, may be a
great disservice to the administration of the antitrust laws,
which, from time to time, need splendid demonstrations of the
power to deal with the real thing.
one to a double charge I realize.

To talk this way -- opens
I am sure the notion,

which I think a necessary one, of symbolic concentration
cases is very troublesome.
stated the

mat~er

Conversely, the way I have

may be regarded as being too unsympathetic

to the assumed need

1:0

stop the trend of concentration or to

increase the number of industries now dominated, as the saying
always goes, by four or five firms.

As to the assumed

concentration increase over the years, I think there is very
little to support this picture, although it may be true.
To adopt a change in the law which creates a rebutable
presumption that monopoty power exists if it is shown that
four or fewer firms account for 50% or more of the aggregate
market share, or which automatically goes after any firm having
a market share of at least 70% seems to be destined to
create a different form of government control over industry.
But as to this perhaps one might consider a suggestion.

The

issues can be enormously complicated in concentration cases;
at least not many can be prepared and tried at once.

It

might be a valuable step to have legislation through which
the President every five years would appoint a short-term
independent commission, composed of attorneys, economists and
other experts from outside the government, which would report
on the concentration and structure of American industry from
the standpoint of apparent anticompetitive or monopoly
behavior.

Such a commission if formed should not have a

prosecutorial purpose and ,should not have the power of
compulsory process.

But its report would focus attention on

apparent problem areas.
jiscussion.

A good report would enlighten public

It also·would enlighten the direction of the

enforcement of ti-I.a antitrust laws

It

Needless to say, this

suggestion has not been cleared with anyone.
I am of course aware and I applaud the efforts the
Antitrust Division has made to spur the deregulation of
industry.

While I have some doubts whether as an economic

matter it will make all thdt difference, I also applaud its
efforts to do away with resale price maintenance laws.

I personally

would be particularly pleased if it could do away with the Robinson
Patman Act.

But this pleasure would derive from a position I

took years ago and not from any new look.

In the meantime,

a new consent decree law has been passed with the best
intention in the world, but with the dubious result, I am
sorry to conclude, of making it more difficult for the
Antitrust Division to accomplish its work.

And Congress now

has before it a proposal to establish an Agency for Consumer
Advocacy, which would allow the Consumer Advocate to intervene
at virtually any stage in an administrative process, so
defined that it is possible - although

I

hope this is not

the case - the Advocate could demand the right to participate
in any investigation, meeting or negotiation conducted by the
Antitrust Division, including conferences with any private
party and to intervene at any level in any court proceeding.
I can hardly imagine a greater road block to a successful
enforcement program.

t

,

If the antitrust laws have played their role, as more
or less they have, of insuring creativity and diversity, of
upholding the ideals of freedom of entry into the market
place and into the channels of manufacture and trade, and
have contributed to the reality of our democracy, I hope the
Antitrust Division itself will not fall victim to over
regulation.

It might be poetic justice if it did.

For the

antitrust laws at birth and thereafter were never quite as
pure as on the side of competition as we have tried to make
them.

They were after all in origin at least in some respects

part of the Populist tradition, with a strong dose of unfair
competition theory and desire to regulate mixed in.
over, the

Anti~rust

More

Division is some ways was the original

consumer's advocate, as it still is.
wrote in another connection:

But as Thurman Arnold

the answer to the poetic justice

argument is that I don't like poetic justice.
I guess no one does.

But I hope the Sherman Act and

the Antitrust Division will be here with you, loud and
clear, at least at every five-year interval.

